

अखिल भारतीय ट्रेड यूनियन कांग्रेस  
ALL-INDIA TRADE UNION CONGRESS  
NEW DELHI.

File No. \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT \_\_\_\_\_

(MK)

1962



**AITUC DIGITAL ARCHIVE - 2021**

Folder Code: 4 File No. AI-39 S. No. \_\_\_\_\_

Digital File Code: \_\_\_\_\_

File Title: Military thinking and unilateralism - the technical argument by Raymond Fletcher

Year: 1961 / 1 / 1

Metadata:

Scanned:

Note: \_\_\_\_\_



PREFACE

By CLIVE JENKINS

What sort of leaders and what sort of political policies need the Bomb ?

Can we accept a TUC-Labour Party joint statement which, in 1961's atmosphere assumes that in certain circumstances NATO may use nuclear weapons first ?

Briefly, it seems to us that a national or party attitude that relies on Bomb-ownership or a first use of atomic weapons is anti-human. We believe that any policy with a structure rigid and strong enough to contain the Bomb is freakish and aberrant.

It follows that any leadership which bases itself in manipulating and cultivating such a policy has a warped and unstable judgement.

On the other hand, many of the Joint Statement's advocates seem to have no grasp of the logic of the military situation. They seem not to have measured the current of technical change which is now so rapid that by the time of the Trades Union Congress this autumn the TUC-Labour Party joint statement will be meaningless.

On occasion, to be meaningless is to do no harm. This is not one of those times. For the attitudes mirrored by the Joint Statement could well be read--in some parts of the world--as a step along the road to the "first strike" preventive war still advocated by some influential Americans. We do not share that view.

But a misunderstanding of this type or an understandable misassessment could significantly hamper or harm negotiations between East and West. This is a present hazard.

The military arguments arrayed and illuminated so well by Raymond Fletcher in the succeeding pages show how the evolution of military thinking is proceeding, at least on a technical plane, so much faster than comparable consideration within the Labour Movement.



The conclusion ? The principles proposed to the Labour Party Conference in 1960 by the Transport and General Workers Union are now revealed as having the support of technically-based military arguments, as well as those of political and moral concern.

We believe that they are made utterly convincing by Raymond Fletcher's analysis and commend this survey to the attention of every member of the Labour Movement now making a contribution to the debate.

At least this is a serious initiative to introduce a factual and hardheaded element into the discussion.

In our view, any dispassionate consideration of it will then lead to support for a re-affirmation of the 1960 Labour Party Conference resolution moved by the Transport and General Workers Union.

The time has come for an end to amateurish evaluations of tactical and strategic situations and potential.

The Movement should realise that only political solutions are possible--as well as being desirable. Back to political discussion, then, and honourable negotiations. But remember, this can only be done soon enough by a separate British initiative.

In short, a unilateral renunciation of the Bomb, coupled with a fresh approach to multilateral negotiations which can then be fruitful in the new political situation which will then have come into existence.

Of course, Raymond Fletcher's arguments tend to the conclusion that unilateralists, even if defeated at the 1961 Conference have had the best of the argument and--supported by technical change and the military planners--will be seen in 1962 to have been correct.

Be that as it may, the time is here to negotiate before the accidental catastrophe becomes a statistical certainty due to the multiplication of the ultimate buttons throughout the world.



## MILITARY THINKING AND UNILATERALISM:

### THE TECHNICAL ARGUMENT

MANKIND IS INDOMITABLY optimistic. The end of nearly every war has been hailed as the end of all wars. And each technical advance in the range and destructive power of weapons has been advocated and accomplished as a means of making war impossible by making it more horrible.

The famous Lord Cochrane, for example, submitted a plan for chemical warfare to the British Admiralty in the 1950's. It was pigeon-holed, with commendable revulsion, as being un-Christian and un-British; but Cochrane, one of the most humane men of his time and a militant campaigner for social as well as naval reform, insisted that a preparedness for the worst kind of war was the best way of avoiding all kinds. Alfred Nobel, the inventor of dynamite, had much the same idea. Rational men, he imagined, would not start wars if they knew that high explosives would be used in them.

These were men of the nineteenth century, of course. Their confidence in human rationality was characteristic of their times and supported by their experience. They had not seen, nor could they have imagined, the collective insanity that reached its peak in Nazism. Yet they were accurate prophets in one respect. Military technology has now reached a stage of development that robs Clausewitz's classic definition of war ("a continuation of policy by other means") of every shred of meaning for all except lunatic Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the funeral pyres of all existing doctrines as to the organisation, conduct and purpose of war.

The two atomic bombs that were used in August, 1945 (quite needlessly it seems from subsequent revelations: Japan was ready for surrender) were quite different from all the weapons that had preceded them in the long history of warfare. And the difference did not lie entirely in their phenomenal destructive power. Almost as many people were killed in a single incendiary bomb raid on Tokyo as died in Hiroshima.



One major difference between the two raids was that the first needed whole squadrons and the second only one plane. The Enola Gay, which flew on the Hiroshima mission, carried the equivalent of 20,000 tons of TNT in her bomb bay. It was later estimated, by United States Bombing Survey investigators, that it would have taken 210 Superfortress bombers to inflict the same amount of damage in a conventional air attack. The real significance of the Hiroshima operation is revealed, however, when it is compared with another that had a roughly similar object.

Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbour in December, 1941, was intended to knock the United States off balance, if not out of a war that had not then been declared, with a single, decisive blow. Mounting the attack was one of the most complicated exercises of World War II. The movements of 1,478 land-based aircraft, 169 surface craft and 64 submarines had to be planned, co-ordinated and timed.

The fact that the Pearl Harbour operation failed in its object and that the object of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki operations could almost certainly have been achieved without them need not concern us here. What does is that, in terms of their objects, they were similar operations. Yet what a difference there was in the actual means employed. In the one, 2,248 air and sea vehicles; in the other, two aircraft.

This disparity placed a question mark against the assumptions implicit in the Clausewitz definition. Now that science had put the power to wipe out a city in the hands of a single aircrew, what policies could be continued by these means? If the policies were aggressive, that is, aimed at taking an enemy's territory away from him, the object of the war would be destroyed in the course of it.

Radioactive rubble, scorched earth and decimated populations are not worth the taking. If the policies were defensive, what would be the use of inviting atomic retaliation by initiating an atomic attack? If only a dozen enemy bombers



got through, a dozen cities would be destroyed. The atomic bomb, a weapon of mass destruction, made every policy in pursuit of which it might be used too costly in every sense of the term. That is why it has not been used since 1945, despite the continuous fighting that has gone on in various parts of the world--notably in Korea--during the last 15 years.

Now even the atomic bomb is an antiquated weapon. In 1952 the first hydrogen bomb blew Eniwetok atoll off the face of the earth and a new and sinister term made its way into the strategists' vocabulary. The force of the atomic bomb had been measured in kilotons, i.e. units equivalent to 1,000 tons of TNT. That of the hydrogen bomb was measured in megatons, i.e., the equivalent of 1,000,000 tons of TNT. The first hydrogen bomb was 750 times more powerful than the first atomic bomb. The question mark grew larger as the explosions got bigger. What kind of policies could the use of hydrogen bombs serve, particularly since there was no longer an American monopoly of them? The first Russian bomb was tested in 1953.

War is not just violence any more than an army is an armed mob. War is controlled violence. Hydrogen bombs offered no possibility of any kind of control being exercised in any conflict in which they were employed. What kind of military organisation could survive in Britain after a score of 20-megaton bombs had obliterated our cities, killed half our population and clouded our skies with lethal fall-out?

There is no longer any need to theorise about the obliteration of control. Recent NATO manoeuvres have demonstrated quite clearly that the introduction of high-yield nuclear weapons into any kind of battle robs commanders of their power to command. Let me take the NATO exercise "Carte Blanche" staged in June, 1955, as an example. Three ~~thousand~~ thousand and fifty-five nuclear projectiles were assumed to have been used in it, their explosive force ranging from two to 40 kilotons of TNT.



"Carte Blanche" took place in West Germany and was a simulated defensive operation against a predominantly air attack from the East. The hollowness of the term "defensive" is revealed by the official estimates of the civilian casualties that would have been caused--1,700,000 killed and 3,500,000 wounded. This was the first lesson spelled out by "Carte Blanche".

The second lesson has been emphasised by Wing Commander Asher Lee. "To make war internationally on a large scale," he wrote in Tribune on 13th May, 1960, "one must have a reasonable hope that the plan of attack or defence can be carried out and that some form of consecutive communication can be maintained between headquarters staffs and the armies, air forces and navies in the field (or on and under the water).

" 'Operation Carte Blanche'. . . which exercised the large-scale use of atomic weapons on both sides, made it clear to those of us who covered these manoeuvres that within a few hours of combat neither side would have the ability to control the battle and prevent military chaos... we can take the chaos of 'Carte Blanche' as a reliable blue-print which makes nonsense of the words 'planning', 'tactics' and 'strategy' in their military context."

So it does. The only possible conclusion had been drawn by Marshal of the RAF, Sir John Slessor, in a broadcast talk given a few months before "Carte Blanche". "For hundreds of years people have been trying to abolish war", he said, "and history is littered with the debris of pacts, leagues and pious resolutions of all sorts. What has happened now is that war has abolished itself, which is the only way in which it could be abolished, and the thing that has done it is the weapon of mass destruction". (our emphasis.)

Yet the five years since "Carte Blanche" have brought about a revolution in military technology. Up to them military



research concentrated on getting what the Americans call a "bigger bang for a buck". Since then it has taken the opposite direction. Most of the recent weapons tests have been of nuclear warheads of decreasing force. In 1958, the Americans achieved a major technological breakthrough when they fired a nuclear shell with a force of only six tons of TNT. Reducing the destructive force of nuclear weapons, it was thought, would make them usable in the field as instruments of policy. The Clausewitz definition seemed to be acquiring meaning once again.

All three American services have now added a bewildering assortment of low-yield nuclear weapons to their armouries. An their units in NATO--along with those of America's allies--are being equipped with them and trained in their use. These are the so-called tactical nuclear weapons. Most of them are short-range missiles like the Honest John and the Little John. But the eight-inch howitzer has also become a nuclear weapon. Similar developments have transformed the armouries of the Warsaw Pact forces. Russian units now have a 203 mm. nuclear cannon, with a range of 15 miles, and a 240 mm. nuclear mortar with a range of 20 miles as well as short-range missiles.

In theory, therefore, it seems that controlled battles are possible once more, and that war need not be a nuclear holocaust that would bring down the curtain on human history. Such a view ignores certain elementary facts about human behaviour in battle. It also assumes that a commander in the field can exercise the same kind and degree of control over all his units as is customary in peace-time. An examination of the operational possibilities of one tactical nuclear weapon throws much light on the question.



The Davy Crocket missile is fired from a launcher rather like an enlarged bazooka. It has a nuclear warhead and its range is between two-three miles. Compared with a 20-metaton H-bomb it seems a comparative innocuous weapon, plainly designed to check troops and unsuitable for destroying cities. Limited in range, limited in explosive force, limited in its potential targets, the Davy Crockett seems an ideal weapon for use in a limited war.

But how can any future war remain limited? It is true that in the Korean conflict there was a tacit acceptance by both sides of certain Queensbury rules. United Nations forces did not use the A-bomb. The Chinese and North Koreans refrained from naval operations, though as Mr. Martin Lichterman points out in his contribution to the symposium National Security in the Nuclear Age, "it is entirely possible that the enemy could have acquired a navy--especially submarines--from the Soviet Union, which had supplied the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists with their air force and most of their other equipment." Korea, however, was unique. The pattern of that war provides no indication whatever that it could be, or would be, repeated in Europe.

Yet, if war does come to Europe, it is highly unlikely that it will begin with an exchange of intercontinental, high yield missiles between the Soviet Union and the United States. Given the prevailing attitudes on both sides, neither will desire to be the first to press the ultimate button. The idea that World War III would open with such a devastating exchange and then continue as a "broken-backed war" --small armed groups fighting as well as they wherever they could--has now been abandoned. For it has been clearly demonstrated in the last few years that the launching of a general nuclear war--even a preventive one--has no part in the immediate military plans of either the Soviet Union or the United States.



But the bloody trench-warfare of 1914-18 was also ~~it~~ not planned, intended or even foreseen by any of the general staffs before it actually happened. The first casualties in any war are the predictions made about its actual course and conduct.

One prediction, however, is permissible. And that is that every weapon available to both sides will, in fact, be used as the war proceeds if either side thinks it can gain an advantage thereby. Moral inhibitions are the second casualty in war. The Allies began World War II with leaflet raids. They ended it with the atomic raids on Hiroshima and Nagasaki--operations that would have been considered unthinkable and morally abhorrent in 1939.

Now let me resume the argument that even small-yield nuclear weapons, designed for purely tactical uses, cannot restore to war its old function as the continuation of policy by other means. The first question to be answered is: how could such a war break out if nobody actually wanted it ?

In a period of mounting political tension, every military action by one side, even if it amounts to no more than re-deployment, is apt to be misinterpreted by the other. If ~~the~~ a diplomatic struggle about the status of West Berlin were taking place, for example, a frontier clash between troops of the East and West German armies would seem much more than an incident. Both armies would almost certainly reinforce the troops involved--such reinforcement being a quasi-automatic process--and a skirmish would thus widen itself into a small battle. As it did, the machinery of NATO and the Warsaw Pact would grind into action. Communications between Eastern and Western capitals would either or, broken or, much worse, distorted.

A commander in the field has only two ways of stopping a battle once it has started. He can either retreat or win.



In the heat of battle he cannot be expected to regard nuclear weapons as essentially different from conventional ones-- except in so far as they give him increased firepower.

The vision of a unit commander is even more limited. For him, battle burns away every consideration but one. His own unit must not be overrun. If it is threatened he will use every weapon at his disposal to beat off the enemy. This is the way men behave in war. They are soldiers, not diplomats.

The most important feature of the Davy Crockett missile is that it can be handled by a single platoon. This means that, in battle, its use could be ordered by a platoon commander. It is no use giving such a weapon to fighting troops unless they are expected to fight with it. To withhold the nuclear warhead would be an act of unilateral disarmament.

Once even a Davy Crockett is fired, however, and its radioactive effects are detected by the enemy, whatever inhibitions, political or moral, he may have about using nuclear weapons would be removed. He would retaliate. And, as the battle widened, larger-yield nuclear weapons would be brought into action. This is the process of escalation. The use of each nuclear weapon automatically leads to the use of the next in range and destructive power.

To check the enemy's entry into the widening battle area, intermediate range missiles would be fired at his communications and assembly points. This is the purpose of such missiles ~~as~~ as the solid-fuel Pershing, with its range of 700 miles, and the guided Sergeant, with its range of 75 miles upwards. These are weapons of interdiction. They make military sense only when it is anticipated that all Europe could become a single battlefield as a result of the process of escalation. In such circumstances the difference between tactical and strategic weapons disappears. There remains only the difference between their tactical or strategic use.



A conflict which began with rifle shots could, therefore, end with Europe in ruins and the Soviet Union and the United States attempting to blast each other off the face of the earth with long-range, high-yield nuclear missiles. A limited nuclear war, as Dr. Henry Kissinger, originator of the idea, has now admitted, is a contradiction in terms.

Nuclear weapons in themselves would blast away the limits imposed on any war in which they may be employed, no matter how it starts or how trivial the accident or miscalculation which starts it. The chain of escalation is as much a fact of military life as a chain of command.

"While it is feasible to design a theoretical model for limited nuclear war," writes Dr. Kissinger in his recent book *The Necessity for Choice*, "the fact remains that 15 years after the beginning of the nuclear age no such model has ever achieved general agreement. It would be next to impossible to obtain from our military establishment a coherent description of what is meant by 'limited nuclear war'." Later in the same book he outlines the factors he ignored when he was designing such theoretical models. "If nuclear weapons become an integral part of the equipment of every unit," he writes, "it will be next to impossible to keep a war conventional, regardless of the intentions of both sides. Even if the intention is to employ nuclear weapons only as a last resort, this becomes empty when the interpretation of this step becomes more and more decenralised. A regimental or even a divisional commander should not be the judge.

"Lacking the overall picture, he will always be tempted to utilise all his available weapons. When he is hard-pressed, it would require superhuman discipline not use arms which he believes may solve his difficulties. And the further down a unit is in the chain of command, the less can its experience be taken as a guide to the general situation. Regiments or even divisions have been destroyed even in



the midst of an overall victory."

Only one sentence in this passage requires correction. Though a regimental or even a divisional commander should not be the judge, actual battle would inevitably put him in a position where he must be. This awful responsibility could, in battle, even descent on the shoulders of an NCO. Platoon officers have a high casualty rate in war.

The problem of controlling a nuclear war has not been solved either in theory or by manoeuvres. General Norstad, NATO Supreme Commander, has thrown out several tentative ideas; but he has done so in a manner that suggests confusion more than anything else. The trend in current military thinking is to forget about the command problems raised by nuclear weapons and to concentrate on building up conventionally armed forces as though the nuclear deterrent did not exist. But it does. It cannot be uninvented.

So long as it does, staff officers and academic strategists (such as the prolific theorists employed by the American RAND Corporation) will continue to work out hypothetical military uses for it. Though Mr. Harold Macmillan has said that if the nuclear deterrent is used it will have failed, it ceases to be credible as a deterrent <sup>unless it</sup> ~~is used~~ intended for use. A potential enemy will not be frightened into better political behaviour unless he knows he has something to be frightened of.

Marshal Malinovsky certain knows. He has said that "in determining the course of the future development of our armed forces in the context of a reduction in numbers we assume that a future war, if it is unleashed, by the aggressors will be waged with the mass employment of nuclear weapons. We emphasise this because in the West much is now said and written about 'limited nuclear war', about 'the tactical employment of nuclear weapons' and about 'the strategy of graduated doses'..."



This statement was the culmination of a prolonged, semi-public discussion of the operational problems raised by nuclear weapons. In the course of it, explains Dr. H. S. Dinerstein in his RAND Corporation study War and the Soviet Union, the doctrine of the pre-emptive strike emerged. According to this, the only way in which nuclear weapons could give an advantage to the power using them would be in a carefully timed missile attack, designed to knock out an enemy's missile launching sites and air bases before he could use them for a surprise attack. Nuclear weapons could be used and controlled, in short, if they were used in a first-strike that would virtually end a war before it had begun.

Similar assumptions about the potential military value of a first-strike have been freely discussed in the West too. But here again, what looks feasible on paper bristles with difficulties as soon as it is worked out in terms of actual weapons, deployed in the real world. Now that the United States is concentrating much of her nuclear capacity in mobile, undetectable weapons systems like the submarine-launched Polaris and the rail-mounted Minuteman no first-strike could prevent retaliation against those who mounted it. The Patrick Henry, it should be remembered, packs more destructive force in her 16 Polaris missiles than all the bombs that were dropped during World War II. As the Polaris undersea fleet increases, the possible gain from a first-strike against the United States decreases. It is the same the other way round. The Soviet Union has submarine-launched missiles (Golem and Komet). And it is doubtful whether the U2 flights, and similar reconnaissance operations, have revealed more than a fraction of her missile-launching sites.



There are, moreover, almost insuperable technical difficulties in mounting a first-strike. These are so great that Professor P.M.S. Blackett openly doubted, in an article published in the April, 1961, issue of Encounter, whether such a strike, involving as it would be co-ordination of about 200 missile-launchings could be mounted at all.

Yet despite the technical difficulties of using nuclear weapons in a future war, to say nothing of the moral inhibitions their destructive power imposes on their use, they continue to pile up in the armouries of the great powers. One generation of missiles breeds another. As one American expert put it, as soon as you can use any given weapons system it becomes obsolete. Our own ill-fated Blue Streak, scrapped before it was test-fired, underlines the point. Yet, according to Professor Louis Sohn of Harvard, the combined destructive power of the world's nuclear weapons is equivalent to 60,000,000,000 tons of TNT--20 tons of explosive for every man, woman and child on earth.

This is a precise measurement of what is called the balance of terror. 60,000 megatons, it is claimed, have kept us from a major war because of the restraint they have compelled political and military leaders to exercise. Safety, as Sir Winston Churchill said in his last message as Prime Minister, has become "the sturdy child of terror and survival the twin brother of annihilation." But has it? The theory of deterrence, which is quite a different thing from a theory of defence, is a superficially attractive one. Now that both the great power blocs are sitting on thousands of megatons of concentrated hell each will be afraid of starting anything that would end in the incineration of both.



Professor G.T. Schelling has put the theory in another way. He argues that we have returned to the hostage system of the Middle Ages but on a larger scale. Most of the population of the Soviet Union are hostages to American nuclear weapons systems and vice versa. In this situation, argues Professor Schelling, strategy resolves itself into the skilled non-use of nuclear weapons.

But there are dangers inherent in the balance of terror itself. They become apparent as soon as the theory of deterrence is worked out in terms of real armies, navies and air forces. The armed services cannot just sit on their nuclear weapons. They must be at instant readiness to use them, otherwise the deterrent, by ceasing to be credible, ceases to be a deterrent, as explained above.

Instant readiness increases the dependence on radio communications, radar warning systems and practice alerts. This, in turn, increases the danger of war by accident. False alarms have occurred with depressing frequency in recent years. That they have not so far led to disaster has been due mainly to the fact that we are still in the era of the manned bomber. No "fail safe" procedure, however, can work with missiles. A pilot can be recalled: a missile in flight cannot. Captain Liddell Hart drew the necessary conclusion from this in his book Deterrent or Defence.

"It is hardly possible," he wrote, "to frame or rely upon, any technical safeguard that can be foolproof or governmental check that can be effective when detection systems can provide barely fifteen minutes' warning of a missile attack launched against the United States, and of four minutes at the most in the case of Britain and the countries of Western Europe".

The possibility of war by accident has undoubtedly been



exaggerated by some spokesmen of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. It is simply not true that a nuclear war might be unleashed sometime during the next few minutes because of a false alarm on a radar screen, a mistaken assessment of Russian intentions, a pilot's nervous breakdown or a short circuit in a missile-launching device. Such horror stories should be left out of a serious argument.

The possibility, however, exists. And a war by accident or miscalculation would not be a continuation of policy by other means. It would merely be a catastrophe, like the volcanic eruption that destroyed Krakatoa in 1883. By 1975, calculates Mr. Herman Kahn in his massive study On Thermo-Nuclear War, there will be 50,000 lethal buttons to press in the world. Our planet, in short, will have converted itself into a vast Krakatoa, virtually at the mercy of electronic devices that will have replaced human beings in vital areas of the decision-making machinery.

How far this process of automating war could go was illustrated recently by the suggestion that NATO could overcome the 15-fingers-on-the-trigger problem by means of a computer. Each member government would feed in its own assessment of the circumstances in which it would regard it as permissible to use nuclear weapons. If war broke out, NATO's Supreme Commander would not need to consult his 15 political masters. A computer reading would give him, within a few seconds, a precisely calculated consensus of their views. Fantasy perhaps. But in this age, fantasy has the bad habit of turning itself into reality very rapidly. One device installed in America ensures that a retaliatory strike could be fired even if the missile crews had been killed off. The radioactive fall-out from the enemy's missiles activates an automatic firing mechanism.

I need not dwell on what a nuclear hobcaust would actually be like. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament



has, to its credit, educated us all in this respect. But two quotations from Herman Kahn's study *On Thermo-Nuclear War* can educate us further. Mr. Kahn, it must be remembered, believes that such a war would not end human life, or organised society, in any of the countries involved.

"If it is not acceptable to risk the lives of the 3,000 million inhabitants of the earth in order to protect ourselves from surprise attack," he writes, "then how many people would we be willing to risk? I believe that in the United States and NATO would reluctantly be willing to envisage the possibility of one or two hundred million people (i.e. about five times more than World War II deaths) dying from the immediate effects, even if one does not include deferred long-term effects due to radiation, if an all-out thermo-nuclear war results from the failure of Type 1 deterrence."

Earlier in the book Mr. Kahn prints a table giving his estimates of the time it might take to recuperate, economically, from different post-war states. It starts with 2 million dead (recovery from which might take one year) and ends with 160 million dead (a disaster it would take a century to repair). I am not concerned with the feasibility of the calculations. I quote Mr. Kahn's table to show the numbers of casualties that are allowed for in RAND Corporation discussions of what thermo-nuclear war would be like. (Mr. Kahn is not, of course, an advocate of what he describes. It is unjust to describe his book, as *The Scientific American* did, as a tract on mass murder.)

It should be obvious, from the above-quoted figures alone, that the present arguments within the British Labour Movement about nuclear weapons are not arguments about defence. Deterrence and defence are two different things, though the first may be offered as a substitute for the second and, indeed, has been accepted as such by the British Government. The British Army of the Rhine is now so saturated with nuclear weapons that it could not fight a conventional war



at all. We are ready for the ultimate catastrophe in Europe, in fact, but do not have the equipment necessary to fight another Boer War if Dr. Verwoerd's future actions were to provoke one (as well they might).

Military planners discuss weapons, transport and troops only when they have finished discussing the situations wherein it may be necessary to use them. In other words, they discuss politics first. So should the Labour Movement. The questions to which we must find answers are these: Is the West in danger of a Soviet attack? If so, what kind of attack? What measures are necessary to remove the danger of attack? And should such measures be military, political or both? The debate on nuclear weapons must be about foreign policy, not military strategy.

It is a waste of intellectual effort to work out credible nuclear strategies for a future war, whether in the RAND Corporation or at meetings of the National Executive of the Labour Party. All this quasi-technical talk of "first-strike capacity", "effective NATO control" and "pre-strike consultation" makes the Labour Movement look ludicrous. Practised strategists like Sir John Slessor and Captain Liddell Hart do not indulge in it. Both insist that statesmanship ("the realm of grand strategy" as Liddell Hart calls it) must solve the problems that military leaders are no longer able to.

Nuclear weapons can no more be used in war, as Clausewitz defined it, than a circular saw can be used in an eye operation. Clear thinking about them demands, first of all, a recognition that they cannot even be regarded as weapons. They are the detonators for a global Krakatoa. The only question that they raise for politicians is: how they can be got rid of? The questions they raise for military commanders, as I have shown, are unanswerable. War has abolished itself for all civilised persons. On this rock-like proposition let all statements by the Labour Movement be based.

-----



america - ally or master?  
by bob edwards, m.p.

.....

#### FOREWORD

For more than twenty years, the economic superiority of the USA over every other country in the world has given her an unchallengeable mastery in foreign affairs. This mastery she will continue to enjoy until either the USSR or Communist China can build up its economy to outstrip her.

Existing in a war-torn world, with two-thirds of the world living below the poverty line, the economic mastery and self-sufficiency of the USA has given her unparalleled power for good or evil over the lives of millions of non-Americans.

In spite, however, of her ability to supply for her people all their needs, the capitalist economy of the United States has made it essential for her to export - or even in some cases to give away the fruits of her people's labour, if mass unemployment and hunger were not to result.

How, during the years of her mastery has the USA made use of this unprecedented power? Before we consider some examples, it is important to understand the role of the Pentagon in the USA.

.....

#### THE POWERS OF THE PENTAGON

Since the end of the Second World War, the influence of the American Armed forces within the structure of the American state has increased enormously. Nowhere in any Western democracy have the leaders of the armed forces achieved so much ascendancy as that which exists in America today. Nowhere in the world have the military men



such overwhelming power to destroy our universe as that which is held by the Pentagon at this moment. Indeed, these increasing powers have an influence at every level of the American economy.

The Pentagon has become a state within a state transforming democratic principles into a mockery. The emergence since 1945 of a 2,700,000 strong peace-time armed force, with its annual expenditure of 40,000,000,000 dollars has placed tremendous authority into the hands of the leaders of the American armed forces. Such an expenditure involving tremendous economic, political and social ramifications covering orders for military supplies, expenditure on scientific research, industrial development with thousands of militarily financed factories at home and abroad, has placed in the hands of a very few American generals who form what is called the Pentagon, unprecedented peace-time mastery which is completely incompatible with democratic practices. With this power has developed in America a public relations organisation controlled by the military and accountable to no democratic check which is infinitely more costly and powerful than any other public relations organisation in a country where such huge expenditure on moulding public opinion has become commonplace.

The Pentagon, as part of its organisation, has a continuous and permanent lobby in the American Congress. It sends out a daily flow of information and service propaganda to American army, navy and airforce centres and camps and centres all over the world. It has established military information offices in every town and city in America and large military information centres in New York, Chicago and Hollywood each with staffs of highly trained specialists in public relations.



These information centres feed ideas and material to a great network of Pentagon-created private groups such as the Navy League, the Association of United States Army, and the Airforce Association. It keeps in close touch with such "patriotic" and political groups as the American Ordnance Association, the Reserve Officers Association and all the various veteran organisations with which America abounds. Indeed, the Pentagon's Public Relations Organisation has become so strong and politically challenging that it is now no longer accountable to the elected government.

The Navy, for example, has a special department which deals with relations with the Film Industry to which it offers "full co-operation" including assistance in the preparation and revising of scripts for films, loans of equipment and material, access to unedited and unclassified films, permission to operate inside naval establishments on condition that the industry is willing to co-operate to the full. If, however, any section of the industry is considered as unwilling to accept advice and co-operate with the navy particularly in writing and/or revising of scripts, all such facilities are automatically refused.

The army and the airforce have similar specialised departments which also take in the Broadcasting and Television industries. General Maxwell Taylor in his last report as Chief of Staff stated "the character of our Public Relations Information has been shaped by the need for the troops and the public to fully comprehend the role of the armed services as an indispensable element of our national deliverent posture and the Navy as an instrument of prosperity."

It is becoming almost impossible under present conditions for any nominee for President or Vice-President in either the Republican or Democratic Parties to get through without the support of the Pentagon.



Any nominee dedicated to the active advocacy of disarmament would be, and has been, a subject of a barrage of propaganda from all the military service departments. So dangerous and challenging to democratic principles have become the Public Relations activities of the Pentagon that three times during the last eight years, the American Congress has been compelled to take decisions aimed at curbing its activities. These decisions were taken following repeated attempts to influence the legislation of Congress in favour of the services and against the Government of the nation.

In 1952 the US Congress wrote <sup>into</sup> ~~in~~ the Defence Appropriation Act, a new clause deliberately aimed at limiting the activities of the Pentagon in open manifestations of political action to gain public support. This attempt by Congress was justified on the grounds that inter-service rivalries were dangerous to security but the terms of the limitations which Congress tried to impose on the military pointed to a much more serious matter than such rivalries. The special provisions in the Act were to minimise the increasing intensity of military-created pressures on Congressmen and actual contact with public "news media representation, preparation of material solicited or unsolicited for active use of such media."

Following the passing of these provisions in the Defence Appropriation Act, the Pentagon made not the slightest attempt to abate these propaganda activities, indeed, they cleverly used the new situation for their own purpose by interpreting the provisions as a granting of permission to withhold information of a certain nature from both public and press. They even flouted Congress by spending an extra 300,000 dollars a year on a new service to defend the services from inquisitive students and pressmen who were seeking military information other than that provided by



the Pentagon's own press department.

A further attempt was made to check the excesses of the military in public relations and publicity tactics by Congress in 1958 when President Eisenhower was prevailed upon by the elected Congress members to intervene in the dispute between Congress and the Pentagon. Eisenhower presented proposals to Congress under the Defence Re-organisation Act. One of his proposals was "to control defence dollars spent on publicity and influence campaigns". Immediately following the passing of the Act the President charged the Assistant Secretary of Defence for Public Affairs to become responsible for Services Public Relations but even the President's directives were of no avail and were indeed less successful than the previous decision of Congress dealing with financial limitations. The public outbursts of the Service Departments and their excursions into political affairs continued.

A clear example of the unwillingness of the Armed Services to accept control over its public relations was shown during the 1959 debate on the budget when General Taylor, Chief of Staff, made public a serious attack on the Senate Armed Services Committee because of its decision to reduce the Army's Air Defence programme. In so doing the chief of staff completely by-passed the President's directions and gave the Assistant Secretary of Defence no opportunity of reading his statement in advance which had been provided for by a Congress Act based on prior scrutiny.

The consequences of this illegal intervention of General Taylor's into purely political matters compelled a subsequent re-consideration of the whole Air Defence expenditure as far as the Army was concerned.

\* \* \*

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Unfortunately it is the same General Taylor, now retired as Chief of Staff, who has been appointed by President Kennedy to head an investigation into the policy and



organisation of the Central Intelligence Agency headed by Allen Dulles. This enquiry follows the complete failure of the military adventure against Cuba which was organised and sponsored by Allen Dulles and his agency and supported by the Pentagon.

Ever since the setting up of the CIA, America has blundered into mistake after mistake in world diplomacy and foreign affairs, and the Cuban fiasco has only brought to a head the dangers both to America and world peace arising out of the operations of this formidable spy organisation, which employs directly a staff of 40,000 and employs over 100,000 spies in different parts of the world. It is indeed a sad commentary on America's role in world affairs when it allows its Intelligence Service to constantly interfere in political decisions, particularly when this Intelligence Service has failed so miserably in the past to collect accurate information on which political decisions have been made.

It was Allen Dulles and his organisation that advised America back in 1948 to support Chiang Kai-shek, and America has been committed to this policy ever since. They failed completely to foresee the possibility of Communist China intervening in the Korean War in 1950. They failed completely to estimate Colonel Nasser's capacity to maintain control when, on the advice of John Dulles, the World Bank withdrew the proposed loan for the building of the High Dam at Aswan.

In 1957 American Intelligence were so badly informed about the anti-american feeling in Latin America that they allowed Vice-President Nixon to make a tour which ended in a complete fiasco and his visit had to be abruptly ended. The CIA completely underestimated the situation in Iraq which led to the seizure of power by Kassim.



They continued to advise support for Syngman Rhee in South Korea and were surprised that mass disturbances took place which resulted in the overthrow of his near-Fascist regime. Their intelligence and spy network were just as unsuccessful in Turkey when they were taken completely by surprise by the collapse of the Menderes regime, which was maintained in power by American dollars and arms.

They had no understanding in 1960 of the Japanese situation and had to cancel President Eisenhower's visit with a heavy loss of prestige to the American Head of State. It is a dreadful state of affairs when an organisation based on paid spies should have such a profound influence on American ~~not~~ foreign policy and indeed on the peace of the world, as the Cuban adventure so clearly indicates.

\* \* \*

#### THE USA AND BRITAIN

When Britain was the great creditor nation of the world, there was a free flow of capital investments all over the world. In all the countries where large British investments had an influence on the economies of these countries, there was a free flow of exports into the British market. These were the days of free trade, and free trade was a profitable business for Britain as the workshop of the world. This is hardly the case today, as far as American dollar investments are concerned. The American tariff system is so complex and so subject to changes by lobby vested interests that the American market is the most difficult in the world to penetrate. Secondly, the American State Department has been playing a decisive role in American capital investments abroad. Many examples outside Britain can be given of how political pressure has been exerted as a condition of even private investments. An outstanding case was America's policy towards the nationalist government of Iran in 1953 when the deliberate blocking of American loans and private investments led to the overthrow of a



Government elected by popular votes and the seizure of power by the Army which has imposed on Iran, to this day, a military semi-dictatorship. Out of this affair came the negotiation of oil concessions which resulted in the American oil monopolies achieving their first and substantial inroads into the oil supplies of Iran.

The situation in Cuba is another very recent example of how nationalist movements that have achieved popular support can be provoked into extreme anti-American policies because of the persistent interference of the State Department in laying down political conditions for the continuation of capital investments.

A major factor leading to the defeat of the Liberal Government in Canada was the arbitrary decision of Fords of Detroit to impose a veto on its Canadian subsidiary which had decided to accept a large order for tractors from China at a time when thousands of motor car workers were unemployed. This situation hardly applies to Britain at this moment, but it could, under certain conditions, create serious difficulties for a Labour Government in its efforts to plan the national economy or organise its export trade on the basis of increased trade between East and West.

In 1949 American investments in Britain amounted to 729 million dollars, 464 million dollars of which was invested in manufacturing industries. In 1959, however, this investment had increased to 2,268 million dollars, 1,460 million of which is in manufacturing industry, in 1960 the total direct investment had increased to 2,930 million dollars. America's total investment in Western Europe in 1959 amounted to 2,530 million dollars, the proportion in manufacturing being 1,950 million dollars, in 1960 total direct investment, in the Common Market countries had increased to 2,690 million dollars.



Thus it will be seen that American investments in Britain in proportion to Western Europe is particularly noticeable. The chemical, engineering and motor-car industries are the main targets for the silent invasion. In 1960, one in every twenty employed on the manufacturing industries were working for American firms. In the motor-car and chemical industries, it was one in every ten workers.

\* \* \*

#### AMERICA AND THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY

In the chemical industry, these investments have taken the form of the establishment of wholly owned American firms which are extensions in Britain of American monopoly establishments and in most cases they carry into British industry their anti-trade union traditions and make it extremely difficult for British trade unions to organise their employees. A number of American firms in the British chemical industry were originally German firms taken over by American directors prior to the declaration of war in 1939. Two of these firms are Bayer and Abbott. Three other important American firms in the drug and fine chemical section of the chemical industry are Parke Davis, Pfizer and Sharpe & Dohme. All three have been amalgamated to form one company, namely Mercks. Other American firms which produce vital drugs and fine chemicals are Lederle, Wyeth, International Chemical Co., Monsanto, Laporte, Searle, Warner, Lilly, Chas. Phillips, Smith, ~~Kline~~ Kline & Smith, Lambert, Burroghs Wellcome, etc. Laporte's Industries Limited is a British Section of an American monopoly which has five large factories operating in Britain. In 1954 they took over the whole of the share capital of Fullers Earth Union Limited, one of the oldest established British chemical firms.

These American firms usually operate on exclusive American patents which, although patented in Britain, cannot be exploited by any British firm without the payment of exorbitant royalties, and even then they must receive



the permission of the American company which holds the patent rights and invariably quotas of production are established with secret agreements involving fines for production over and above the quotas allocated. Apart from this, many British chemical firms are often unable to take out patents on drugs and fine chemical compounds which have been discovered in their own laboratories because they must first receive permission from the British Medical Research Council. Such conditions, however, are not essential for the American firms who can produce these drugs in Britain for export to world markets. This leads in many cases to the abandonment of British discoveries to American companies and gives them exceptional licensing privileges in Britain and the world, eventually resulting in complete monopolies.

On the distribution of drugs, the American firms completely by-pass the established channels for the distribution and supply of drugs in this country. They distribute drugs direct to the Health Services and direct to doctors without giving the consumers the advantages of the additional profits which arise from this method of distribution.

The average profits for the seventeen major American firms operating in the chemical industry are 70 per cent as compared with an average of 20 per cent for British firms and 13 per cent for Swiss-owned firms. A number of antibiotic drugs supplied by one American firm exclusively to the Health Service can be purchased at half the price in France manufactured by the same firm. Much inducement in the form of gifts and discounts, together with expansive propaganda, is used based on American methods to out-manceuvre the British companies which are reluctant to use these methods of salesmanship. Thus very considerable American inroads into the British chemical industry create new problems for any future Labour Government which may desire, in the interest of a free and expanding Health Service, to bring under social ownership or public accountability those sections



of the industry which supply life-saving and curative drugs. Indeed, Sir Thomas Williamson, the General Secretary of the General & Municipal Workers' Union, used this fact at the Trade Union Congress as a reason why it would be very difficult to carry through any policy based on public ownership of the chemical industry.

\* \* \*

#### THE FORD TAKEOVER BID

The decision of Fords of Detroit to take over the whole share capital, with the permission of the British Treasury, of Fords of Dagenham, underlines very clearly the dangers arising from increasing American capital investments in our British industry. Apart from this, the British Government have already agreed to subsidise a new Ford factory in the North of England to the extent of £9 millions as part of the policy of relieving the distressed areas. This amounts to a free gift of British taxpayers' money to the Fords' shareholders. The takeover bid of Fords increased in one day Fords 54 per cent capital investment in Fords Dagenham by a sum of £40 millions. To subject a vital British industry to such stock exchange speculations in itself is a disturbing feature of this kind of investment as far as the industrial workers are concerned.

The decision of American Fords to increase their investment from 54 per cent to 100 per cent has only one meaning, namely to exert complete control over Fords of Dagenham as distinct from ownership. This places absentee owners into a position where they control 50 per cent of the British motor-car industry. The resultant consequences are not far to see. If a deep recession strikes the American motor industry, the American owners of the Ford motor-car cartel will be under very considerable political and industrial pressure in America and will automatically give preference to their Detroit factories as far as protection is concerned as against their British and



European establishments.

Further, the development of the Common Market of the six European countries means that the production of the Ford small car, which has been a speciality of Fords of Dagenham, will be curtailed so as to give this market as an exclusive monopoly to the German Ford factory which is also 100 per cent owned, thus placing in jeopardy the employment and living standards of many thousands who are employed in industries which supply the many and various spare parts.

This is a characteristic example of what can happen and what is happening in many vitally important British industries where American capital investments have placed them in a position of control.<sup>1</sup>

\* \* \* \*

#### THE USA AND GERMAN ARMAMENT FIRMS

Between the Wars, three great chemical monopolies, I.G. Farben of Germany, Du Ponts of America and Imperial Chemical Industries of Britain, dominated the chemical trade of the world.

By far the largest of the three was I.G. Farben, who were responsible in 1938 for 28 per cent of the world's chemical trade. They signed over 2,000 cartel agreements and their factories and agencies blanketed the world. In Germany alone, Farben controlled over 500 factories and the

<sup>1</sup>A list of America-financed firms known to be operating in the British chemical manufacturing industry in December 1956, according to D.S.H. Dunning in his book, American Investments in British Manufacturing Industry, is given in the Appendix.



directors contributed largely to the Nazi seizure of power. They financed the Nazi Party and during the war, its directors, managers and chemists were responsible for the worst kind of industrial slavery in the history of Europe. So bad was their behaviour that the de-cartelisation of I.G.Farben was written into the Peace Treaty, but despite all the promises made that after the cessation of hostilities, this chemical octopus would be broken up and its trade marks made illegal, the pursuit of power politics by the American administration in Europe made it possible for the I.G.Farben directors to evade the conditions of the Peace Treaty and regain their ascendancy to redominate the chemical trade of Europe and to threaten once again the peace of the world.

The light sentences imposed on the directors of I.G.Farben were attributed by Josiah E.Dubois Jnr. who was Chief Prosecutor in the I.G.Farben case, to the fact that American policy changed as far as Germany was concerned early in 1947. He blames the American negative anti-Communist policy for this, and he went out of his way to write a book entitled "Generals in Grey Suits" to prove his contention.

It is well that it be put on record that so indignant were the German people when they heard of the role of I.G. Farben in the rise of Hitler that three plebiscites conducted during military occupation in the French, British and American sectors, resulted in an overwhelming majority vote not merely for the de-cartelisation of I.G.Farben but for the public ownership of all the factories of this sinister combine. The British and French were prepared to apply this demand of the German people, but it was bitterly opposed by the Americans. Indeed, in 1947 a leading American legal adviser, who in a General's uniform had actually prepared the plans under military government for de-cartelising I.G.Farben, was back in Germany as a civilian lawyer retained by I.G.Farben directors to show them how to



slip the meshes of his own de-cartelisation proposals.

It was the American lawyers in General's uniform who, because of their fear of public ownership and because of their negative anti-Socialism, placed I.G.Farben back in power and campaigned for the re-organisation of this chemical monopoly in three groups so that its factories, patents and trade marks could still be retained and thus clauses in the Peace Treaty ~~w~~ evaded.

In 1951 the Western occupation authorities issued a new law under which the concern was to be divided into five independent companies. This was merely a duplication of the plan the I.G.Farben directors had themselves drawn up during the war to simplify supervision of their empire.

Though formally divided, I.G.Farben, or rather its successor companies, represent an integral monopoly concern controlling the whole of West German<sup>K</sup> chemical industry. The three chief successors are Farbenfabriken Bayer, Badische Anilin- u. Sodafriken, and Farbenwerke Hoechst. They are closely interconnected through joint marketing agreements and organisations, joint shareholdings in other companies and interlocking directorships.

This is how they fared in 1952-1959.

	<u>1952</u>	<u>1957</u>	<u>1959</u>
Bayer Group:			
Sales (M000,000)	866.9	1,853.1	2,459.0
No. of employees (000)	33.2	49.8	55.1
Badische Anilin:			
Sales (M000,000)	661.8	1,690.0	2,268.0
No. of employees (000)	25.7	38.4	43.6
Hoechst Group:			
Sales (M000,000)	761.9	1,761.0	2,222.0
No. of employ- ees (000)	26.2	42.7	45.4



Organised around the "big three" are over fifty subsidiaries. Total production capacity is much bigger than before the war and total sales average from 8,000 to 10,000 million Marks a year which makes I.G.Farben one of the world's biggest monopolies.

Carefully camouflaged war production was resumed in the early years after the war. Since then the three have gone in for extensive production of jet and nuclear fuels and hold a leading place in West Germany's atomic industry. There is an I.G. nuclear research centre at Griesheim near Frankfurt on Main and I.G.Farben has a dominant share in ~~the~~ Kernreaktor, the West German atomic power organisation.

In this new production line, I.G.Farben closely co-operates with other big concerns - Dugussa which specialises in refined uranium, plutonium, etc., the Metallgesellschaft which produces strategic metals and nuclear materials. In addition I.G.Farben works in close contact with a number of French firms and is associated with Franco-Bonn Research Institute at Saint-Louis, France, where new types of weapons are being developed.

I.G.Farben has re-established most of its old agencies abroad and started a number of new ones. It has also resumed and extended its cartel and licence agreements with American and British firms. Last September, for instance, the Bayer Group signed an agreement with the U.S.General Electric for an exchange of polymere patents.

International financial interests are well represented. One of the directors of the Bayer concern is S.Bentinck of I.C.I. The Lazard Brothers Bank is represented on the Badische Anilin board by Simon Lazard.

The disastrous consequences of I.G.Farben's excursions into the politics of Germany which led to the seizure of power by Hitler are well known. It is thus particularly



dangerous to note that I.G.Farben has substantially consolidated its position in Government. The Federal Minister for Atomic Energy, Dr.Siegfried Balke, is a former director of Wacker-Chemie, an I.G.Farben subsidiary. The Federal Atomic Energy Commission includes other representatives of I.G.Farben, among them Ulrich B Haberland and Karl Winnacker. The chairman of the Atomic Energy Committee of the German Manufacturers' Association, Alexander Menne is a director of the Hoechst concern.

In the diplomatic service, I.G.Farben is represented by von Maltzan, for a long time Bonn Ambassador in France. Dr.Wilhelm ~~Haas~~ Haas, the present Ambassador in Japan and I.G.Farben's Eastern representative during the war, Heinz Krekeler, former Ambassador in the United States and now Bonn's representative on Euratom.

\* \* \*

#### THE USA AND GERMAN RE-ARMAMENT

When President Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Stalin met at Teheran in 1944, the basis of co-operation between the three countries was established and it was agreed that this co-operation would continue after the defeat of the Nazis. Indeed, a concrete basis was established at Teheran for this co-operation particularly as it related to America and the Soviet Union. The Trade Agreement was signed between the two countries which allowed for the purchase by the Soviet Union of tremendous quantities of machine tools, agricultural equipment, power plants and oil refineries.

The details of the credit arrangements were even written down and initialled by both Roosevelt and Stalin and these allowed for credits to the USSR amounting to 10,000,000 dollars but almost before the ink was dry on this initialled agreement and only a week after the Teheran Conference, an American military mission was discussing with King Saud of Saudi Arabia a concession for the establishment of one of the world's largest American air bases in the deserts of Saudi Arabia - an air base which subsequent events proved



was built for the purposes of American policy in Asia and the Middle East and the American experts who had been advising President Roosevelt at the Teheran Conference, remained in the Middle East and conducted a series of secret negotiations with Kings of Egypt and Saudi Arabia deliberately aimed at undermining the influence of Britain in the oil lands of the Middle East.

Thus even before the end of hostilities the American military were busily making their plans over the head of President Roosevelt to make difficult or even impossible the agreement arrived at by the heads of the three Governments at the Teheran Conference.

This policy of the Pentagon was particularly noticeable during the period of military government in Germany after the collapse of the Hitler regime. Extraordinary steps were taken even then to prepare the way for the establishment of a strong Germany as a close ally of America. It was these activities of the American military which created the atmosphere for the cold war which has divided the world ever since and to understand the reactions of the Soviet Union to these military manoeuvres it is necessary to look back to the role ~~of~~ the Soviet Union was designed to play in Hitler's Nazi Reich, the role of a slave state inhabited by under-privileged sub-humans.

Only an understanding of this Nazi design can lead to an appreciation of the fact that there can be no peace in the world until the German problem is solved by disengagement, disarmament, by the complete neutralisation of Germany. Such a solution has from time to time been politically acceptable to America, Britain and the Soviet Union but on each occasion the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency have moved into action and prevented a solution.

When the Germans launched their armies against the Soviet Union in June 1941, part of the design for the Soviet lands they hoped to conquer was embodied in a number of



plans and army orders. These proclaimed the complete suspension of the laws of humanity and of international law in the most calculated manner. Soviet citizens were described in these orders as "Asians, Slavs and Jews". German officers were vested with complete powers to shoot or hang, without trial, Soviet officers and army commissars. All Jews in Soviet territories were to be exterminated. These plans for the Slavic East were expressed in many of Hitler's speeches and writings.

Martin Bormann, Hitler's secretary, wrote the Nazi policy for the Soviet Union into a document of instructions to the German invasion armies which, among other things, stated: "The Slavs are to work for us; insofar as we do not need them, they must die." Therefore compulsory vaccination and the German health services are superfluous in these lands. The fertility of the Slavs is undesirable. They may use contraceptives and practice abortion. Education is dangerous. It is sufficient if they can count up to a hundred. An education is admissible which produces only useful servants. Every educated person is a future enemy. Religion we leave to them as a means of diversion. As far as food is concerned, they should receive no more than necessary. We Germans are the masters. We must come first."

This was the German plan for murder, plunder and enslavement designed for the peoples of the Soviet Union and actually practiced by the German Army and administration in the Soviet lands occupied by them. These documents were taken from the archives of Berlin after the collapse of the Hitler regime. They were studied by the Americans, the British and the Russians. Thus it will be seen how fatal to world peace was the decision to re-arm Germany following the continued pressure of the leaders of the American armed forces. Let the following facts relating to the American role in the militarisation of West Germany



speak for themselves:

German Defence Minister Strauss said in his interview on July 28, 1959 that the Bundeswehr should be prepared to conduct the atomic war.

Liddell Hart, writing in Reynolds News stated: "According to the number of divisions the German Army is actually the strongest national contingent in NATO. After the complete formation of the twelve divisions by 1962 the German army will be as strong as all NATO armies put together."

Another statement in the New Statesman said: "Within the next two years the Bundeswehr will be rapidly converted into the greatest army in Western Europe". The call up of the Bundeswehr will be started on April 1st of this year. 38,000 persons born in 1939 will be called up. The strength of the Bundeswehr will be equal after this call-up to 256,000 persons." (Die Welt, 1.1.60)

"During the last five years 35,000 million Marks or 68.5 per cent of all military expenditure was allocated to the Bundeswehr. The bulk of the military expenditure is for the purchase of arms and other military equipment. The following expenditure is estimated for the year 1960-61:

Purchase of aircraft	...	Marks	404 million	
Acquisition of equipment for airfields	...	,,	27	,,
Construction of ships	...	,,	343	,,
Acquisition of military transport		,,	792	,,
Ammunition	...	,,	583	,,
Communication	...	,,	190	,,
Research Work	...	,,	350	,,
incl. the Franco-German Institute in Saint-Louis	...	,,	3.7	,,
Financing of NATO headquarters	...	,,	26.5	,,

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25.2.59)



There is in existence a NATO document known as MN.70. The contents of this document have been leaked in both Bonn and Washington, and it is clear that many of the decisions are bilateral arrangements between America and West Germany and have not been discussed in detail by all the NATO powers.

The plans allow for the establishment in Europe of over 500 nuclear missile bases. They allow for the purchase of 1,300 American planes for the West German Air Forces and the manufacture of a larger number under licence from the American firms concerned in West Germany. The plans also deal with the arming of West Germany with nuclear rockets CC of medium range, but these medium range rockets can travel 1,800 miles. This in itself is a clear violation of the Peace Treaty as far as the arming of West Germany with nuclear arms is concerned. Another aspect of this alleged agreement is the establishment outside Germany of military training grounds and facilities for storage for the German Army, and the whole question of military training facilities in Spain is also dealt with in this document.

These proposals were to be submitted by America at a NATO meeting, and it is extremely doubtful whether any preliminary discussions have taken place with any of the NATO powers other than West Germany and America.

Several months ago a meeting of German Generals, all of whom had served under Hitler, made public a Memorandum which insisted on the necessity for West Germany to ~~have~~ have an independent nuclear deterrent. This was not an argument in favour of the German Armed Forces having nuclear arms under NATO. It was for completely independent West German nuclear weapons. The close alignment of the German General Staff with the Pentagon at Washington makes the publication of such a Memorandum quite impossible unless



it was first discussed with the Americans. Thus it is clear that American sanction has been given before the document was published.

One of the signatories to the Memorandum of the German Generals is the Inspector of the German Air Force. He was a General under Hitler. Recently he wrote an article in a German magazine, entitled "The Art of War" in which he stated that had the Nazis possessed the atom bomb, they would have completely destroyed both Britain and France and won the second world war.

The adjutant to this General is now in East Germany and if half of the statements he is making are true, they amount to a frightening and formidable indictment against the present German General Staff. For example, he reports a meeting of German Generals with the present German Defence Minister, a meeting which he claims he personally attended, and this meeting came to the conclusion that as ~~the~~ there were too many Communists in France and too many Socialists in Britain, both Britain and France were bound to be unreliable allies in the event of war. The German Army, therefore, should be equipped with nuclear weapons because it might be necessary in an emergency to neutralise both Britain and France.

From all this, it is perfectly clear that there is a complete lack of integrity and honest dealings between Britain and America, even on questions of defence. The British Prime Minister was forced to admit that he had no prior knowledge of the 24-hour alert which was ordered by an American General. A few days prior to the Paris Summit Conference, the British Prime Minister was again compelled to admit that he had no prior knowledge of the U-2 incident which contributed to the wrecking of the Summit Conference.



In all these matters, which could involve the destruction of Britain and Europe, there seems to be little accountability to the elected representatives of the people. The American ~~Congress~~ Pentagon is becoming increasingly less accountable to the American Congress and even to the American President. It could hardly be expected that the same gentlemen will make themselves accountable to the Parliament of the NATO countries and even to the elected representatives of NATO. It is becoming abundantly clear that if human freedom is to be maintained, very great changes are urgently necessary in the relationships between Britain and America.

\* \* \*

#### THE USA AND FRANCO SPAIN

In 1945 with the collapse of the Nazis, Fascist Spain looked more and more an anachronism. The victorious Allied countries ~~and~~ ostracised the Franco regime and Spanish democrats increased their efforts to overthrow the hated Spanish dictator. In 1946 the American State Department published the White Book on Spain which was the most damning indictment of the Franco regime ever produced. This document led to a debate in the United Nations' General Assembly on December 9, 1946 and the following resolution was carried and signed by the representatives of America, Britain and France:

- (a) In origin, nature, structure and general conduct, the Franco regime is a Fascist regime patterned on, and established largely as a result of, the aid received from Hitler's Nazi Germany, and Mussolini's Fascist Italy;
- (b) during the long struggle of the United Nations against Hitler and Mussolini, Franco, despite continued Allied protests, gave very substantial aid to the enemy powers. First, for example, from 1941 to 1945, the Blue Infantry Division, the Spanish Legion of Volunteers and the Salvator Air Squadron fought against Soviet Russia on the Eastern Front. Second, in the summer of 1940 Spain seized Tangier in breach of the international statute, and as a result of Spain maintaining a large army in Spanish Morocco, large numbers of Allied troops were immobilised in Northern Africa;



- z (c) incontrovertible documentary evidence establishes that Franco was a guilty party with Hitler and Mussolini in the conspiracy to wage war against those countries which eventually in the course of the world war became banded together as the United Nations. It was part of the conspiracy that Franco's full belligerency should be postponed until a time to be mutually agreed upon.

The General Assembly, convinced that the Franco Fascist Government of Spain, which was imposed by force upon the Spanish people with the aid of the Axis Powers and which gave material assistance to the Axis Powers in the war, does not represent the Spanish people, and by its continued control of Spain is making impossible the participation of the Spanish people with the peoples of the United Nations in international affairs . . . "

The solution suggested by the democratic countries is expressed in the following lines signed by three prominent statesmen:

". . . . It is hoped that leading patriotic and liberal-minded Spaniards may soon find means to bring about a peaceful withdrawal of Franco, the abolition of the Falange, and the establishment of an interim or caretaker government under which the Spanish people may have an opportunity freely to determine the type of Government they wish to have and to choose their leaders. Political amnesty, return of exiled Spaniards, freedom of assembly and political association and provision for free public election are essential. An interim government which would be and would remain dedicated to these ends should receive the recognition and support of all freedom-loving peoples."

Signed: GEORGES BIDAULT, JAMES F. BYRNES, ERNEST BEVIN, March 4, 1946.

And in consequence of the carrying of this resolution, Spain's representatives in the functional organisations of UNO were compelled to withdraw.

It was not until 1953, following the signing of a military agreement between America and Spain, that the isolation of a Spanish regime was broken. Since that time Franco has slowly climbed to respectability and favour and more United States military and economic aid has been given to Spain than to any other European country in the same period with the possible exception of Western Germany.



Today there are more American bases in Spain than anywhere else in Continental Europe.

In 1959, Spain was admitted, under American sponsorship, into the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) and credits amounting to 375,000.000 dollars were granted to Franco by OEEC, the International Monetary Fund and the US. This is more than ten times the total amount made available in the special United Nations Fund for the underdeveloped countries of the world.

Mr. Herter, the ex-United States Secretary of State, recently stated before the American Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he would like to see Spain in NATO. France, Germany and other NATO countries are reported to have agreed with him but Britain and the Scandinavian countries have so far opposed this move. The time has surely come for a detailed enquiry into the dangerous development that has lifted Franco Spain from a position of ~~x~~ isolation and economic collapse to its present status in world affairs when it is being courted by some of the Western countries.

It is clear that the USA's ideological hatred of communism and, indeed, her mistrust of anything but the free-for-all capitalism she herself embraces, has led her to misuse her economic strength to bolster up reaction from East to West.

\* \* \*

#### THE PAST AND THE FUTURE

Under the Dulles regime a policy of anti-Communism blinded the American administration to many grave injustices that existed in different parts of the world. Policies were pursued which put reaction in power lumping Communists, Socialists and Democrats in one camp.

In the pursuit of the "Anti-Communist" crusade, Socialists were treated as enemies of freedom and known and open dictators



were preferred and supported against Social Democrats. This has been the case in Japan where the American administration maintained its support for the militaristic Conservative Prime Minister to a point when great masses of the people revolted in favour of a more moderate administration. Similarly in South Korea, a corrupt and undemocratic regime led by Syngman Rhee was maintained in power by American dollars and influence until the people were compelled to seek a safety valve through violence. The intervention of the Pentagon and the American monopoly industrialists in Germany in favour of Dr. Adenauer's Christian Democrats undoubtedly contributed largely to the defeat of the moderate Social Democratic Party. In Italy the Christian Democratic Party and the Catholic Trade Unions have been preferred to genuine libertarian Socialists and trade union forces, and the massive economic and military aid which America has placed at the disposal of Dictator Franco in Spain, has beyond question kept this Fascist regime in power.

The creation of a great network of American bases throughout the Western world, bases often maintained against the democratic will of the Governments in many of these countries, has also contributed to a belief that American foreign policy is based solely on military strategy rather than on the principles of democratic freedom. Iceland, Cuba, the West Indies, and the increasing tidal wave of opposition in Scotland to the Polaris atomic submarine bases in the Holy Loch, are characteristic examples where America has failed to maintain the goodwill of the population as far as military bases are concerned, and this goodwill has been lost because of the doubts created in the minds of millions of people regarding America's democratic intentions and the feeling that the military have gained ascendancy over American politics at the expense of the elected representatives of the people. Since the beginning



of lease-lend many political conditions have been laid down by the American administration as a basis for this aid and in recent years the whole flow of American investments has been conditioned by military and political considerations rather than on the principle of human needs.

This pamphlet attempted to analyse some of the disconcerting features of American policy in many parts of the world. It dealt particularly with many unhappy relationships that have arisen between America and Britain. The pamphlet is biased, however, in so far as it does apportion a good deal of the blame of the Cold War on the consequences of American foreign policy and finance policy, and in this respect it may be a somewhat unfair analysis. Insofar as it draws attention to dangerous tendencies in the Western world, it is aimed to serve a purpose, the purpose being to arouse public opinion and particularly American public opinion before it is too late, to the consequences of such policies if they are maintained by the American Government. The new President, with his Democratic majority, had a glorious opportunity of bringing the changes in American policy abroad by

- (a) withholding support for dictatorships and, instead, directing America's surpluses to those parts of the world where they are urgently needed, irrespective of strategy or political considerations;
- (b) making a real effort to wipe out the bitter past and commence a new policy based on multilateral disarmament so that world tension can be eased and the dreadful menace of the continuation of the Cold War can be halted.

The greatest responsibility in this connection rests on the shoulders of President Kennedy. In Dante's *Inferno* the man on the lowest rung of the ladder descending to purgatory was not the murderer, the thief or the criminal; he was the man who had been given the grand opportunity and had failed to use it. History seldom gives leaders of



men the opportunity that is now possessed by America's President to commence a new beginning in world affairs and so lay the foundation of a new world era founded on peace and security.

Unfortunately the pressure of the Pentagon and the overwhelming and sinister power of Allen Dulles and his Central Intelligence Agency obviously still influences American foreign policy. The intervention of Allen Dulles' organisation into Cuban affairs and the failure of this adventure should have some impact on the thinking of the new President, although his recent speeches do not suggest a break from the past. It is to be hoped for the sake of the peace of the world that this most recent failure of American intervention in the affairs of other countries will bring to an end an era of brinkmanship and thus clear the way for the acceptance of the great nationalist social revolution which is the outstanding tendency of our times, and which cannot be halted by force of arms but must be accepted by the great powers as the natural development of peoples fighting for freedom, independence and the right to run their countries without foreign interference and intervention.

---